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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
As a broad legal power enabling governments to take 
land and resources from citizens for public purposes, 
expropriation can help governments serve public needs. 
However, expropriation can also trigger land disputes and 
threaten the wellbeing of the people who rely on the land 
for their livelihood. When misused to benefit exclusively 
private interests, expropriation can line the pockets of 
corrupt officials and private companies, without any 
benefit to the public. When expropriation decisions are 
made behind closed doors, the risks to land rights and 
livelihoods may intensify.
Even when expropriation is used for a genuine public 
purpose, compensation and resettlement measures may 
reduce the living standards of affected landholders, 
particularly the poor and vulnerable who depend on their 
lands for food, income, cultural identities, and other 
basic needs. The ripples caused by expropriations can be 
far-reaching: insufficient compensation and resettlement 
assistance hampers the ability of affected landholders 
to purchase or relocate to alternative land, leaving them 
homeless and without income. Without a home or income, 
affected populations may fall into poverty, suffer health 
problems, or endure other consequences of displacement, 
such as lost community structures and unraveling of the 
social fabric. 
Recognizing a need for established international norms 
governing land tenure, the UN Committee on World Food 
Security, in 2012, endorsed a set of voluntary principles 
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known as the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries, and Forests 
in the Context of National Food Security (VGGTs). The 
VGGTs establish best practices that “are backed by 
international consensus of governments, international 
NGOs, civil society, and the private sector.”1 Section 16 
of the VGGTs establishes standards on expropriation, 
compensation, and resettlement.
Assessing National Expropriation Laws in  
Africa and Asia
Encroaching on Lands and Livelihoods considers whether 
national expropriation laws in 30 countries across Asia 
and Africa follow the international standards established 
in Section 16 of the VGGTs. It analyzes laws against a set 
of 24 indicators (hereinafter “expropriation indicators”)  
based on the standards established in Section 16 and 
Section 16.1: “States should expropriate only where rights to land . . . are required for a public purpose. States should clearly define the concept of 
public purpose in law, in order to allow for judicial review.”
Section 16.1: “[States should acquire only] the minimum resources necessary.”
Section 16.1: “[States] should respect all legitimate tenure rights holders, especially vulnerable and marginalized groups, by . . . providing just 
compensation in accordance with national law.”
Section 16.2: “States should be sensitive where proposed expropriations involve areas of particular cultural, religious or environmental 
significance, or where the land . . .  [is] particularly important to the livelihoods of the poor or vulnerable.”
Section 16.2: “States should ensure that the planning and process for expropriation are transparent and participatory. Anyone likely to be affected 
should be identified, and properly informed and consulted at all stages.”
Section 16.3: “States should ensure a fair valuation and prompt compensation . . . Among other forms, the compensation may be, for example, in 
cash, rights to alternative areas, or a combination.”
Section 16.5: “Where the land . . . [is] not needed due to changes of plans, States should give the original rights holders the first opportunity to 
re-acquire these resources.”
Section 16.6: “All parties should endeavor to prevent corruption, particularly through use of objectively assessed values, transparent and 
decentralized processes and services, and a right to appeal.”
Section 16.8: “States should, prior to eviction or shift in land use which could result in depriving individuals and communities from access to their 
productive resources, explore feasible alternatives in consultation with the affected parties . . . with a view of avoiding, or at least minimizing, the 
need to resort to evictions.”
Sec. 16.9: “States should, to the extent that resources permit, take appropriate measures to provide adequate alternative housing, resettlement or 
access to productive land.”
Box ES-1  |  Highlights from Section 16 of the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure  
 of Land, Fisheries, and Forests in the Context of National Food Security
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provides examples of expropriation practices drawn from 
literature reviews to illustrate the importance of adopting 
international standards. Based on this analysis, the paper 
offers a set of recommendations that identifies steps that 
governments, civil societies, and other stakeholders can 
take to adopt international standards on expropriation, 
compensation, and resettlement.
The 24 expropriation indicators are designed to align with 
the principles established in Section 16 of the VGGTs. 
They ask yes or no questions about the legal provisions 
established in expropriation laws. (“Partial” is an answer 
option where laws only partially satisfy the question asked 
by the indicator.) Answering the questions posed by these 
indicators entailed reviewing a broad range of legally 
binding instruments, including national constitutions, 
land acquisition acts, land acts, communal land acts, 
agricultural land acts, land use acts, regulations, and 
court decisions. 
Key Findings
Assessing domestic expropriation laws in 30 countries 
against the standards set by Section 16 of the VGGTs 
reveals that: 
 ▪ Only four of the 30 countries clearly define “public 
purpose,” thereby easing judicial review.
 ▪ Of the 30 countries, India and Taiwan are the only 
countries with laws that limit the amount and types  
of lands that governments can acquire.
 ▪ Of the 30 countries, only India, Vietnam, and 
Indonesia have laws that require governments to 
survey, inform, and consult affected populations  
prior to expropriation.
 ▪ Only six of the 30 countries have laws that make 
strides toward respecting legitimate tenure rights 
by ensuring customary tenure holders and users of 
undeveloped areas are entitled to compensation. 
 ▪ None of the 30 countries have laws ensuring that 
the government will conduct a comprehensive* 
and gender-sensitive valuation of compensation 
consistent with the VGGTs. Although India's Right 
to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land 
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlment Act 2013 
partially addresses gender issues, the remaining 
countries have laws that establish gender-neutral 
compensation procedures, meaning they are silent 
on whether compensation must reflect the differing 
ways in which women and men hold and use their 
lands and resources. Especially in societies with 
patriarchal land governance systems, gender-neutral 
laws may ensure that compensation is paid only 
to the male heads of households, leaving women 
disproportionately burdened by land acquisitions. 
Additionally, almost all of the laws assessed do not 
ensure that compensation will adequately reflect the 
historical and cultural connections associated with 
the land.
 ▪ Eight of the 30 countries have laws that provide for 
prompt payment of compensation, a right to negotiate 
compensation amounts, and a right to challenge 
compensation decisions before courts and tribunals.
 ▪ Of the 30 countries, only India has a law providing 
robust rehabilitation and resettlement procedures.
Recommendations
The majority of countries assessed do not have 
expropriation laws that are consistent with the 
international standards established in Section 16 of the 
VGGTs. To harmonize national laws with international 
standards, expropriation laws should be reformed to:
1. Provide a clear conceptualization of public 
purpose to allow for judicial review. In 
accordance with Section 16.1 of the VGGTs, laws 
should provide a clearly defined list of public purposes 
to give courts guidance when determining whether 
proposed expropriation decisions serve genuine public 
purposes. Laws should subject government decisions 
to independent and impartial oversight by judiciaries 
to ensure proper checks and balances, and prevent 
executive and legislative branches from abusing or 
misusing expropriation power.  
* “Comprehensive” as used here means accounting for the following land value attributes: economic activities, improvements, and historical/cultural connections associated with the land. 
Additionally, “comprehensive” refers to procedures that provide alternative land as a compensation option.
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2. Limit the amount and types of land that 
governments can expropriate. Governments 
should consider adopting laws that obligate them to 
conduct and publish a cost-benefit analysis before 
expropriating lands, whereby the government weighs 
the costs borne by the affected populations and 
the environment against potential public benefits. 
Using this cost-benefit analysis, governments should 
consider conducting a “proportionality test”2 for 
proposed expropriation projects. This test would 
determine whether the expropriation project is 
necessary to serve a public purpose, whether the 
project is suitable, and whether the benefits deriving 
from the expropriation are proportionate to costs 
borne by affected populations and the environment. 
3. Establish transparent and participatory 
processes for expropriating land. To conform 
to Section 16.2 of the VGGTs, governments should 
be legally obligated to survey, inform, and consult 
affected populations in an open and participatory 
manner prior to taking possession of expropriated 
land. By surveying affected populations, governments 
can determine who is entitled to compensation 
and understand the impact of the expropriation on 
livelihoods. Providing information on expropriation 
plans to these populations can be an effective first 
step toward ensuring that these populations are able 
to participate meaningfully in expropriation decision-
making and other processes (e.g., compensation 
processes, resettlement processes). 
4. Respect legitimate tenure rights by ensuring 
that customary tenure rights holders and 
users of undeveloped areas are compensated 
when their lands are expropriated. To ensure 
that tenure rights are respected, governments should 
be required to compensate all affected populations, 
including unregistered customary tenure rights holders 
and users of pastures and other undeveloped areas.  
5. Ensure that governments follow a 
comprehensive and gender-sensitive approach 
to compensating affected populations. 
Governments should be required to follow a gender-
sensitive approach to providing compensation 
that accounts for the losses borne by women and 
men due to expropriation. For compensation to 
comprehensively reflect the losses borne by the tenure 
rights holders, payments should reflect the land’s 
historical and cultural value, in addition to economic 
activities and improvements associated with the land. 
Additionally, states should be legally obligated to pay 
compensation to affected populations prior to taking 
possession of the expropriated land and to ensure 
that affected landholders can negotiate compensation 
amounts and appeal compensation decisions before 
courts or tribunals. 
6. Minimize forced evictions and, if evictions  
are unavoidable, provide displaced persons 
with a relocation allowance, alternative 
housing and/or access to productive 
alternative land. Governments should be legally 
required to avoid or minimize forced evictions. When 
forced evictions are unavoidable, the government 
should be legally obligated to consult displaced 
persons and provide them with a relocation allowance 
and alternative land to ensure that they are not at 
risk of poverty or otherwise harmed. Lawmakers 
should look to India’s Right to Fair Compensation and 
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and 
Resettlement Act of 2013 as a model when drafting 
resettlement procedures. 
1. INTRODUCTION
In almost all countries, governments can acquire—or 
“expropriate”—privately held land for a public purpose as 
long as affected populations are compensated (see Box 1 
for definitions of terms). Expropriation for genuine public 
purposes can promote public benefits by allowing the 
government to acquire land for developing roads, dams, 
and schools; designating protected areas; and  
other public purposes. 
In some countries, however, governments transfer 
acquired land to private companies, often for the 
purpose of extracting natural resources for export. These 
expropriations are usually justified as serving public needs 
by increasing public revenues, creating jobs, and otherwise 
stimulating economic growth. In China, Tanzania, and 
other countries, the use of expropriations for commercial 
purposes has increased dramatically in recent years (see 
Box 2).3 Over 3.15 million hectares of farmland in China 
were expropriated (more than 2 percent of China’s total 
arable land) between 1990 and 2002, which caused 
roughly 36.4 million farmers to lose their land.4 Much of 
this land was expropriated for commercial interests.5 
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Acquiring bodies are the government and private entities that carry out the expropriation, compensation, and resettlement processes, including 
government departments, ministries, and agencies or, in some cases, private entities, such as companies investing in land (FAO 2008).
Affected populations are the individuals or groups whose tenure rights are affected by expropriations.
Compensation is the payment, in cash or in kind, made by governments or acquiring bodies to affected populations for expropriation of their 
tenure rights.
Displaced persons are the affected populations forced to vacate their land as a result of expropriation.
Expropriation is the power of government to acquire privately held tenure rights, without the willing consent of the tenure holder, in order to 
benefit society (FAO 2008). In this working paper, “expropriation” refers to eminent domain, takings, compulsory purchase, compulsory acquisition, 
and other names given to this government power around the world. 
Expropriation laws refer to a broad range of legally binding instruments, including national constitutions, land acquisition acts, land acts, 
communal land acts, agricultural land acts, land use acts, regulations, and court decisions.
Land tenure is the statutory or customarily defined relationship among people—as individuals or groups—with respect to land. It includes the full 
range of relationships between people and communities with regard to accessing, possessing, and controlling land and natural resources (FAO 2002). 
Land tenure security is the certainty that the rights to land held by an individual or community will be recognized by others and protected in 
cases of challenges (FAO 2002). This term is further defined as (a) the degree of confidence that land users will not be arbitrarily deprived of the 
rights they enjoy over land and the economic benefits that flow from it and (b) the right of individuals and groups to effective government protection 
against forced evictions (UN-Habitat 2008).
Land tenure risks are the factors that create land tenure insecurity. They include, but are not limited to, overlapping claims to the same parcel of land, 
lack of clarity over who owns the land, non-transparent land governance systems, different systems and institutions allocating and enforcing tenure rights, 
violations of the rights of vulnerable groups, corruption in the system that allocates and enforces tenure rights, and other risks (USAID 2015).
Land governance is the system of rules, processes, and structures through which decisions are made about access to land and its use (Palmer et 
al. 2009). Land can be governed under statutory or customary systems.
Landholders are the individuals or groups that hold tenure rights.
Tenure rights are the rights of individuals or groups, including Indigenous Peoples and communities, over land and resources. Tenure rights 
include, but are not limited to, possession rights, use rights, and rental, freehold, customary, and collective tenure arrangements. The bundle of 
tenure rights can include the rights of access, withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation. 
Box 1  |  Definition of Terms
In Tanzania, according to a World Bank study, expropriated rural land is routinely transferred to private actors.6 The government often justifies these 
expropriations as serving the public purposes of “rational town planning” or “productive rural investment.” According to the study, expropriations 
were perceived by the public as aiming to push out poor and indigenous landowners to allow the rich or the state to derive major benefits.7 
In China, a survey of 467 expropriations in 2002–2003 found that nearly half of these expropriations were for commercial purposes, such as 
factories and real estate development.8  
Box 2  |  Examples of Expropriations for Private Interests
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The abuse or misuse of expropriation power can pose 
significant risks to land tenure security, human rights, and 
livelihoods. For example, the government might arbitrarily 
justify the expropriation of land, or justify expropriation 
under the pretext of serving a public purpose, when the 
proposed expropriation is not actually intended to serve 
a public purpose. Or the government might expropriate 
land citing an “economic development” purpose, and then 
transfer the land to an extractive industry that will not 
actually support local economic growth or otherwise serve 
public interests. In these circumstances, expropriations 
may not only fail to provide a public benefit, but may also 
jeopardize affected populations, including Indigenous 
Peoples and local communities, who depend on their land 
for basic needs, livelihoods, and cultural identities.
Even when land is expropriated for legitimate public 
purposes, compensation procedures can negatively 
impact affected populations. When compensation is made 
conditional on formal legal title, affected populations 
without formal land rights, such as communities with 
customary tenure rights and informal occupants of 
urban areas, may be vulnerable to expropriation without 
compensation. Customary tenure holders are particularly 
vulnerable when laws recognize them only as informal 
occupants or users of government-owned land.9 
Without laws that require a comprehensive* calculation 
of compensation, affected populations may fall into 
poverty or be worse off than before their land was 
expropriated.10 The monetary compensation provided to 
affected populations may be insufficient to cover their 
losses or, if compensation is payable in alternative land, 
the alternative land may be uncultivable or degraded. 
A recent study in Rwanda found that 77 percent of 
expropriated households surveyed experienced income 
loss after their land was expropriated.11 Likewise, more 
than 50 percent of affected farmers surveyed in China 
reported that expropriation caused a reduction in their 
standard of living.12
If governments are not legally obligated to consult affected 
populations, they may make expropriation decisions 
behind closed doors without allowing affected populations 
to participate meaningfully in the decision. In many 
countries, governments often do not make information 
about their use of expropriation available to the public.13  
In Ethiopia, for example, “there is no tradition of 
consultation with rural communities. . . Peasants are 
almost always the last to know . . . and they are informed 
only when implementation is to be undertaken.”14 
When expropriations lead to forced evictions, weak 
resettlement processes can render displaced persons 
landless and subject to significant poverty, health, and 
other risks.15 Displaced persons without evidence of formal 
land rights may be particularly harmed by evictions if laws 
grant resettlement benefits only to formally recognized 
tenure holders. In fact, a principal difference between 
the World Bank’s resettlement policies and country legal 
systems for accommodating displaced persons often 
“centers on the treatment of people who live on or use 
land without legal ownership.”16 Additionally, in India 
and other countries where displaced persons are usually 
not consulted during the resettlement process, inability to 
participate and monitor the resettlement process can lead 
to protests and resistance among affected populations.17 
These conflicts may delay projects and increase costs for 
governments and acquiring bodies.18 
The Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries, and 
Forests in the Context of National Food Security 
The Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance 
of Tenure of Land, Fisheries, and Forests in the 
Context of National Food Security (VGGTs) are the first 
comprehensive global instrument on governance of 
tenure. They establish best practices that “are backed by 
international consensus of governments, international 
NGOs, civil society, and the private sector.”19 The VGGTs 
were prepared through extensive intergovernmental 
negotiations launched in 2009 by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO).20 Ten regional 
consultations with stakeholders brought together nearly 
700 people from the public and private sectors, civil 
society, and academia, representing 133 countries, to 
ascertain and address tenure governance concerns.21 In 
2012, the United Nations Committee on World Food 
Security, a body with 193 member countries, endorsed  
the VGGTs. 
* “Comprehensive” is used here to mean accounting for the following land value attributes: economic activities, improvements, and historical/cultural connections associated with the land. 
Additionally, “comprehensive” refers to procedures that provide alternative land as a compensation option.
WORKING PAPER  |  June 2016  |  7
Encroaching on Land and Livelihoods
While the VGGTs are not legally binding, they work 
in conjunction with other international human rights 
instruments, such as International Labour Organization 
Convention 169 and the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, to ensure that tenure rights 
are respected when state and non-state actors engage 
in activities that affect land. The VGGTs also reflect 
inalienable international human rights, such as the right 
to property,22 the rights to housing,23 and the right to 
an adequate standard of living.24 Private companies, 
governments, NGOs, and other stakeholders are 
increasingly accepting the VGGTs as a new international 
standard on land tenure.25 
The VGGTs present a set of standards to guide 
governments, companies, civil society organizations, 
communities, and other stakeholders on the responsible 
governance of land tenure systems. The standards seek 
to improve the governance of land tenure and protect the 
land tenure rights of all persons, particularly vulnerable 
and marginalized groups.26 The VGGTs cover a range of 
issues relating to land tenure governance, such as legal 
recognition and allocation of tenure rights, customary 
tenure systems, land redistribution, administration of 
tenure (i.e., recording and valuation of tenure), and 
other topics. Section 16 of the VGGTs establishes a set 
of standards or best practices for expropriating land and 
compensating and resettling affected populations in a 
manner that respects and protects their tenure rights  
and livelihoods. 
The VGGTs contain open-ended terminology that is 
intentionally left undefined to provide flexibility to states 
when interpreting its provisions. For example, the VGGTs 
call for states to respect “all legitimate tenure rights 
holders,” but do not define the term “legitimate tenure.” 
For guidance on interpreting the VGGTs and insight into 
the importance of adopting international standards on 
expropriation, this working paper draws on the Food 
and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) publication, Land Tenure Studies 10: Compulsory 
acquisition of land and compensation (FAO Handbook), 
published in 2008, which presents good practices for 
conducting compulsory acquisitions and compensating 
affected populations. Although the FAO Handbook is not 
officially endorsed by the international community, it 
reflects what FAO and its many international collaborators 
consider to be good practices for ensuring equitable access 
to land and increasing land tenure security.27 
The legal analysis in this paper is based on the VGGTs 
because they are the first comprehensive, internationally 
agreed-upon standards on land tenure governance. 
There are, however, other international instruments that 
establish standards on expropriation and involuntary 
resettlement. For instance, International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) Performance Standards 5 and 7, the 
World Bank’s 2001 Operational Policy on Involuntary 
Resettlement (O.P. 4.12), the Asian Development Bank 
Handbook on Resettlement, and the UN Human Rights 
Commission Principles and Guidelines on Development-
based Evictions and Displacement establish best practices 
for expropriating, compensation, and resettlement.28 
Several of the standards established in these instruments 
are similar to those established in the VGGTs.
Scope of this Paper
This working paper compares expropriation laws in 30 
countries against the standards established in Section 16 
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The countries were chosen to cover a broad geographical 
area in Africa and Asia. Because WRI’s Land and 
Resource Rights Initiative focuses on securing the tenure 
rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities, 
countries were selected based on whether there is a 
significant amount of land held by indigenous and local 
communities, and whether WRI’s local partners may be 
well positioned to advocate for legal reforms. This study 
will be expanded to include more countries, particularly 
countries in Latin America.30 
The paper focuses on laws for four reasons. First, laws 
establish how land governance systems should operate. 
Second, laws provide citizens with a set of rights and 
protections. Third, laws establish the obligations of 
governments and private actors. Fourth, laws serve as a 
point of reference when the public wishes to challenge 
government and private actor decisions that violate 
tenure rights.
Who can Benefit from this Research?
This paper establishes a benchmark for progress that 
can assist civil society organizations, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), policymakers, lawmakers, 
advocates, landholders, investors, and others in measuring 
government progress toward adopting international 
standards on expropriation, compensation, and 
resettlement in domestic laws. 
Affected populations and land rights advocates can 
use this analysis to better understand their tenure 
rights, including whether their lands are vulnerable to 
expropriation without adequate compensation. With 
increased knowledge on domestic expropriation laws and 
the VGGTs, affected populations and advocacy groups 
can hold governments and private actors accountable for 
decisions affecting land. 
This paper can also support companies in aligning their 
operations with Sec. 16 of the VGGTs. The Interlaken 
Group, USAID, and Landesa recently developed 
operational guidelines to help private companies address 
land tenure risks by aligning their operations with the 
VGGTs, but these guidelines do not focus specifically 
on Section 16 of the VGGTs.31 In conjunction with those 
guidelines, this paper can support companies engaging in 
activities that involve expropriation, compensation, and 
resettlement. Companies can use this paper to understand 
the domestic legal frameworks of the countries in which 
they make land investments and implement activities 
that require access to land, so they can make sound 
business decisions. This paper may also help companies 
meet corporate social responsibility objectives and 
industry-specific commitments, such as commitments to 
transparency, responsible investment, and compliance 
with applicable laws. Box 3 provides a discussion of the 
relationship between domestic expropriation laws and the 
World Bank Environmental and Social Safeguards.  
There are nine parts to this paper. Following this 
introduction (part 1), the research methodology is presented 
in part 2. Parts 3–7 are organized by the subject matters of 
the expropriation indicators, and each subject matter links 
This paper considers the domestic legal protections in national laws for populations affected by expropriation. However, not all development projects 
are required to follow such laws. Borrowers of World Bank funding, for example, are usually obliged instead to follow the World Bank Environmental 
and Social Safeguards. In July 2015, the World Bank published a second draft of its revised Environmental and Social Framework for consultation.32  
Consultations on the second draft concluded in March 2016, and the final Framework could be published later this year. The Framework establishes 
environmental and social standards (ESS) for borrowers of World Bank funding to assess, manage, and monitor environmental and social risks and 
impacts associated with projects supported by the World Bank. ESS 5 (Land Acquisition, Restrictions on Land Use and Involuntary Resettlement) 
and ESS 7 (Indigenous Peoples) must be followed when World Bank-funded projects involve expropriation and resettlement.33  However, there are 
exceptions that allow for domestic laws to apply in some cases.34  For instance, if a subproject’s environmental and social risk is rated by the World 
Bank not as “high risk” but, rather, as “substantial risk, moderate risk, or low risk,” national laws may apply.35  
More importantly, many companies and banks around the world invest in projects that involve the expropriation of land, but do not borrow money from 
the World Bank or other institutions that have safeguard policies that override national laws when necessary to ensure that tenure rights are adequately 
protected. Because these companies and banks are obliged only to follow domestic laws, it is important to understand these laws’ protections.
Box 3  |  Connections between National Expropriation Laws and the World Bank Environmental and  
 Social Safeguards
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directly to relevant provisions of Section 16 of the VGGTs. 
Part 8 shows the findings by country and region. Part 9 
provides recommendations for governments, civil society 
organizations, and other stakeholders working to reform 
national expropriation laws to ensure that tenure rights are 
respected and protected.
1. Is “public purpose” clearly defined to allow for judicial review?
2. Must the government expropriate only the minimum amount of land necessary to achieve a public purpose?
3. Are areas of cultural, religious, and environmental significance given special protection?
4. Is land that is held by poor and vulnerable groups given special protection?
5. Must the government grant reacquisition rights when the land is no longer needed for a public purpose?
6. Prior to expropriation, must the government identify all affected populations?
7. Prior to expropriation, must the government inform affected populations about the acquisition plan, including the reasons for expropriation?
8. Prior to expropriation, must the government consult affected populations?
9. Are customary tenure holders with formally recognized tenure rights entitled to compensation?
10. Are customary tenure holders without formally recognized tenure rights entitled to compensation?
11. Are users of undeveloped land (land used for hunting, grazing, and other purposes) entitled to compensation?
12. Must the government follow a gender-sensitive approach to calculating compensation?
13. Must compensation reflect the economic activity associated with the land?
14. Must compensation reflect the improvements on the land?
15. Must compensation reflect the historical/cultural connections associated with the land?
16. Is compensation payable in alternative land as an alternative or in addition to cash?
17. Must compensation be afforded prior to the taking of possession or within a specified timeframe?
18. Can affected populations negotiate compensation levels?
19. Can affected populations challenge compensation in court or before a tribunal?
20. Are displaced persons legally entitled to a relocation allowance?
21. Are displaced persons granted alternative land and housing?
22. Must the alternative land granted to displaced persons be “productive” land?
23. Must the government consult displaced persons during the resettlement process?
24. Must the government avoid or minimize forced evictions?
Box 4  |  Expropriation Indicators
2. METHODOLOGY 
Based on the international standards on expropriation 
established in Section 16 of the VGGTs, this paper sets out 
24 expropriation indicators (see Box 4).
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To answer the expropriation indicators, I analyzed 
national expropriation laws, with initial research support 
from legal researchers at WRI and the Harvard Law 
and International Development Society (LIDS). Legal 
researchers at WRI and LIDS conducted the initial round 
of legal reviews for many of the countries in the spring of 
2014. I then conducted an independent review and quality 
control of the LIDS’s legal research in the fall of 2014. I 
presented preliminary findings at the 2015 World Bank 
Land and Poverty Conference and the 2015 Expropriation 
Conference at The Hague. After receiving feedback from 
conference participants and other scholars, I conducted 
a second round of legal reviews between October and 
December 2015. 
The indicators are designed to align with the principles 
established in Section 16 of the VGGTs. The indicators ask 
yes/no questions about the legal provisions established 
in expropriation laws. To answer the indicator questions, 
the researchers and I reviewed a broad range of legally 
binding instruments, including national constitutions, 
land acquisition acts, land acts, communal land acts, 
agricultural land acts, land use acts, regulations, and  
some court decisions. 
Where laws only partially satisfy the question asked 
by the indicator, “partial” was an answer option. For 
example, the question “Is ‘public purpose’ clearly defined 
to allow for judicial review?” (Indicator 1) was answered 
with “partial” in cases where there is a clear list of public 
purposes, but also a vague open-ended clause, such as 
“or any other purpose.” Similarly, the questions about 
public consultation requirements and compensation 
could be answered with “partial” when the laws require 
consultation only under limited circumstances or  
provide compensation for some, but not all, types 
of improvements and economic activities associated 
with the land.This study focuses on whether laws have 
explicit provisions that satisfy the questions asked by 
the indicators. In the absence of explicit legal provisions 
in constitutions, legislation, or regulations that satisfied 
the indicators, the indicator received a score of “no.” 
The study includes an assessment of court decisions 
available online (see Appendix B); however, because 
some court decisions are not available online, it does 
not comprehensively assess court decisions for all 
30 countries. Explicit legal provisions are not always 
necessary for countries to adopt the VGGT principles; a 
court may step in and fill gaps in the law. Nevertheless, 
the existence of legal provisions in legislation and 
regulations provides a greater degree of certainty that 
the VGGT standards in Section 16 will be consistently 
respected and enforced. 
There are several important caveats regarding this paper: 
 ▪ It does not comprehensively assess expropriation 
practices or how laws are actually implemented or 
enforced on the ground. 
 ▪ It focuses exclusively on binding laws on 
expropriation, compensation, and resettlement.  
It does not assess non-binding policies or laws that  
are not in effect.
 ▪ It focuses on expropriation and does not analyze other 
legal mechanisms for restricting or extinguishing 
tenure rights or transferring land.36
 ▪ It is based on desk review of expropriation laws.  
Due to funding constraints, the legal analyses were  
not peer-reviewed by in-country lawyers.
 ▪ Its expropriation indicators focus on legal rights 
that are particularly important to securing rights for 
indigenous and local communities in rural areas, 
in keeping with the focus of the Land and Resource 
Rights Initiative. 
 ▪ It focuses on national expropriation laws. It does  
not assess laws at the subnational level. 
 ▪ Some of the laws assessed were unofficial English-
translation versions of laws originally written in 
non-English languages. In some cases, unofficial 
translations may alter the original meaning and 
therefore the interpretation of the legal  
provisions assessed.
 ▪ The analysis is limited to laws that were available 
and accessible online. Additionally, where available, 
secondary sources on the legal frameworks of the 
laws in these 30 countries were reviewed. While the 
analysis is based on a broad range of legislation, 
regulations, and court decisions for the 30 countries 
assessed, there may be additional laws that are not 
available online and therefore not accounted for in 
the analysis.  
 ▪ The VGGTs are subject to interpretation. The 
expropriation indicators were chosen based on the 
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interpretations provided by the FAO Handbook, which 
shed light on the intent and meaning of Section 16 of 
the VGGTs. Additional or different indicators might 
have been developed for inclusion in this study.
 ▪ The findings are based on the author’s legal 
interpretations, but laws are often subject to varying 
interpretations. In some cases, there may be an 
element of subjectivity in legal interpretations.
3. PUBLIC PURPOSE JUSTIFICATION 
PROVISIONS
Section 16.1 of the VGGTs states that “States should 
expropriate only where rights to land . . . are required for 
a public purpose. States should clearly define the concept 
of public purpose in law, in order to allow for judicial 
review.” (Emphasis added.)
How a law defines “public purpose” is significant because, 
depending on the wording of the definition, it can limit 
the scope of government authority to expropriate land. 
As discussed in the FAO Handbook, clearly defined lists 
of public purposes in legislation provide an established 
inventory of permissible purposes beyond which the 
government may not expropriate land.37 This inventory 
provides criteria that people can use to challenge proposed 
justification decisions in court. Laws with clear lists of 
public purposes (e.g., public infrastructure projects, 
national defense) provide courts with better guidance 
when ruling on expropriation cases and diminish the 
potential for conflicting court decisions. The FAO 
Handbook provides examples of commonly accepted 
public purposes:38
 ▪ Transportation uses including roads, canals, 
highways, railways, bridges, wharves, and airports
 ▪ Public buildings including schools, libraries, hospitals, 
factories, religious institutions, and public housing
 ▪ Public utilities for water, sewage, electricity, gas, 
communication, irrigation and drainage, dams,  
and reservoirs
 ▪ Public parks, playgrounds, gardens, sports facilities, 
and cemeteries
 ▪ National defense purposes
Without a clear definition of public purpose in law, 
executive bodies may misuse or abuse expropriation 
power by arbitrarily justifying an expropriation decision 
under the pretext of a public purpose when the actual 
purpose will not serve public interests. Ambiguous 
definitions of public purpose, or laws that grant broad 
discretion to executive bodies to determine what 
constitutes a public purpose, limit the potential for 
effective judicial oversight. In Ethiopia, for example, the 
government expropriated 100,000 hectares of farmland 
in Gambella for Karuturi Global, Ltd. for the proposed 
purpose of promoting a “better development project”—a 
vaguely defined term in the “public purpose” provision in 
Ethiopia’s expropriation law.39 Ultimately, the company 
did not fulfill its promises to create jobs, provide water 
to villages, and build public infrastructure.40 Examples 
of disputes about the concept of public purpose are 
provided in Box 5. 
In many parts of the world, decision-making on expropriation is 
politically sensitive and a significant source of contention between 
governments and affected populations.  
 ▪ In India, farmers protested and challenged a government 
decision to expropriate village land in 2011, claiming that the 
expropriation was unjustified because it did not serve public 
interests.41 The Supreme Court of India ultimately ruled the 
expropriation illegal, on the grounds that “in the name of 
public interest, the [government] was serving  
private interests.”42  
 ▪ In China, farmers organized a sit-in at a local government 
office after their land was expropriated for the purpose of 
real estate development.43 The protest reportedly triggered a 
violent government response.44  
 ▪ In South Africa, there has been significant public debate 
over whether expropriations are justified for the purpose of 
redistributing land to black populations who lost their tenure 
rights during Apartheid.45  
 ▪ In the United States, affected populations and the public 
protested the 2005 Kelo Supreme Court decision, which 
granted the government broad discretion to justify 
expropriations for economic development.46  
Box 5  |  Defining Public Purpose: A Contentious Issue  
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Research Findings
As shown in Figure 1, only four of the 30 countries 
reviewed (Cambodia, India, Indonesia, and Mongolia) 
have laws with clearly defined lists of public purposes, 
such as public infrastructure projects and national 
defense. These laws also indicate that governments cannot 
expropriate land for a purpose not explicitly included in 
the list.47 
 
Ten of the 30 countries48 received “partial” answers 
because their laws only partially define public purpose. A 
partially defined provision means that there is a clear list 
of permissible public purposes accompanied by an open-
ended clause (e.g. “or other public purposes”). The open-
ended clause grants governments flexibility in interpreting 
what constitutes “or other public purposes.” As the 
FAO Handbook states, partially defined lists of public 
purposes can still provide courts with guidance when 
determining whether an executive interpretation of “any 
other purpose” is outside the scope of the legal definition 
and therefore violates the law.49  Contrasting approaches 
to judicial review of public purpose justifications are 
described in Box 6.  
Sixteen of the 30 countries assessed did not clearly define 
the concept of public purpose; these countries received 
red “no” scores. Of these 16 countries, six50 have laws 
that either vaguely define public purpose or do not define 
public purpose, and 10 countries51 explicitly grant the 
government broad discretion to interpret what constitutes 
a public purpose. According to Zambia’s Land Acquisition 
Act 1970, for example, the President may expropriate 
land “whenever he is of the opinion that it is desirable 
or expedient in the interests of the Republic to do so.”52 
Figure 1  |  Public Purpose Justification Provisions
  Yes
   Partial
  No
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Number of Countries
1. Is “public purpose” clearly defined to allow 
for judicial review? 
In countries where courts have reviewed public purpose justifications, they have often proved lenient and refused to second-guess the executive and 
legislative branches’ rationale for an expropriation. This is especially the case when expropriation laws explicitly grant broad discretion to interpret 
what constitutes a public purpose. In South Africa, for example, executive bodies must provide only a “sufficient reason” why expropriations are 
needed for public purposes.53 Courts will often take this reason at face value and not investigate whether the proposed expropriation is actually likely 
to serve public interests.
In Kelo vs. City of New London, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the fact that expropriations for “economic development” benefit private 
parties and produce only incidental public benefits did not render the expropriation unconstitutional.54 The Court refused to second-guess the 
legislature’s justification for the expropriation and refused to inquire whether there is “reasonable certainty” that the proposed expropriation would 
actually serve a public benefit.55  
In contrast, some courts have taken a more active approach to reviewing justification decisions. In Sri Lanka, for example, the Supreme Court 
overruled a decision to expropriate land for a private golf resort in the Water’s Edge case (2008).56 The Court made its decision despite the legislative 
provision stating that the Minister’s declaration that land is needed for a public purpose “shall be conclusive evidence that such land . . . is needed  
for a public purpose.”57 
Box 6  |  Judicial Review of Public Purpose Justification Decisions
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This provision opens the door for the Zambian President 
to abuse his or her expropriation power by arbitrarily 
justifying an expropriation decision under the pretext of a 
public purpose, when the actual purpose is not intended 
to serve public interests. Overall, as the FAO Handbook 
points out, the public and affected populations in these 
16 countries may be less likely to consider arbitrary 
justification decisions as genuinely serving public 
interests, and more likely to protest such decisions.58 
Key finding: Only four of the 30 countries assessed 
clearly define the concept of public purpose to allow for 
judicial review.
4. LIMITATIONS ON THE AMOUNT AND 
TYPES OF LAND THAT GOVERNMENTS 
CAN EXPROPRIATE
In Sections 16.1, 16.2, and 16.5, the VGGTs establish 
standards for the amount and types of land that can  
be expropriated. 
Section 16.1 specifies that States should acquire only “the 
minimum resources necessary.” Although the VGGTs 
do not explicitly explain why governments should limit 
expropriation in this way, there are two justifications 
for this principle. First, it prevents governments from 
expropriating an excessive amount of land. Second, it 
minimizes infringements on tenure rights and livelihoods.
Where expropriations are relatively low-cost compared to 
voluntary land transfers, governments may be incentivized 
to expropriate an excessive amount of land. In Ghana, for 
example, where the government is not legally obligated 
to minimize the amount of land expropriated,59 the 
government expropriated 167 hectares of land to build 
a school when only 20 hectares were needed.60 The FAO 
Handbook provides guidance on implementing the 
“minimum resources necessary” principle, and states, 
“if the creation of an easement or servitude* can serve 
the purpose of the project, there is no need to acquire 
ownership of the land parcel.”61
Section 16.2 establishes that “States should be sensitive 
where proposed expropriations involve areas of particular 
cultural, religious or environmental significance, or where 
the land . . . [is] particularly important to the livelihoods of 
the poor or vulnerable.” Since the determination of areas 
deserving special protections may vary from country to 
country, the VGGTs do not provide guidelines or examples 
of “areas of particular cultural, religious or environmental 
significance.” However, if governments are not sensitive 
to these areas, such as burial grounds and natural and 
cultural heritage sites, expropriations may harm the 
cultural identities, religious practices, environments, and 
livelihoods of affected populations. 
Section 16.2 of the VGGTs also calls for states to be sensitive 
to areas held by poor and vulnerable groups. Expropriations 
may disproportionately burden these populations, 
including Indigenous Peoples and local communities, 
because land and resources are often their primary source 
of income, nutrition, and other livelihood needs.
Section 16.5 calls for states to grant reacquisition rights in 
the event that expropriated land is no longer needed for 
a public purpose. It specifies that “where the land . . . [is] 
not needed due to changes of plans, States should give the 
original rights holders the first opportunity to reacquire 
these resources.”
Reacquisition rights are another means of ensuring that 
government’s expropriate only the amount of land needed. 
In Bangladesh, for example, where reacquisition rights 
are granted only if the government approves,62 a large 
portion of land expropriated to build the Jamuna Bridge 
subsequently remained unutilized.63 
When expropriated land remains unutilized for a public 
purpose, the identity of the rightful landholders can 
become unclear, leading to land disputes. Reacquisition 
rights ensure that, in the event that a public purpose is not 
achieved, the land is returned to its original landholders. 
This way, affected populations do not suffer long-term 
harm from having to give up their tenure rights even  
when their land is not used for a public purpose. 
* “An easement or servitude is the right to use land for a specified purpose. Under this approach to expropriating land, governments require affected landholders to grant access to and use of 
the landholders’ property for the purpose of promoting a public benefit; governments do not necessarily acquire ownership rights or force affected populations to move off their land.
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Research Findings
Findings related to limitations on the amount and types 
of land that governments can expropriate are shown in 
Figure 2.
Minimum land: Only three of the 30 countries assessed 
(India, Malaysia, Taiwan) require governments to limit 
the amount of land acquired to the amount necessary to 
achieve a public purpose. 
Cultural and other protections: India’s Right to Fair 
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, 
Rehabilitation, and Resettlement Act of 2013, Taiwan's 
Indigenous Peoples Basic Law of 2005, and Philippines’ 
Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 are the only laws 
assessed that require governments to be sensitive to areas 
of cultural/religious significance and lands held by poor 
and vulnerable groups when expropriating land.64 Seven 
of the countries assessed have laws assessed65 have laws 
with provisions that only partially protect these lands 
from expropriation; these countries received yellow 
“partial” scores for indicators 3 and 4.66 
Reacquisition rights: Thirteen of the 30 countries67 
either fully or partially grant reacquisition rights.68 In 
the remaining 17 countries, there is a potential risk that 
excessive land will be expropriated, and subsequently 
abandoned, not utilized, or wasted. 
Key finding: Of the 30 countries assessed, India and 
Taiwan are the only countries with laws that establish 
limitations on the amount and types of lands that 
governments can acquire (based on an aggregation of the 
findings from indicators 2–5). 
5. EXPROPRIATION PROCESSES 
Section 16.2 of the VGGTs states that, “States should 
ensure that the planning and process for expropriation 
are transparent and participatory. Anyone likely to be 
affected should be identified, and properly informed and 
consulted at all stages.” (Emphasis added.)
Figure 2  |  Limitations on the Amount and Types of Land Acquired (Indicators 2-5)
  Yes
   Partial
  No
2. Must the government expropriate only the minimum 
amount of land necessary to achieve a public purpose?
3. Are areas of cultural, religious, and environmental 
significance given special protection?
4. Is land held by poor and vulnerable groups given 
special protection?
5. Must the government grant reacquisition rights when 
the land is no longer needed for a public purpose?
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Surveying, identifying, and even mapping affected 
populations helps governments and acquiring bodies to 
ascertain the impact that the expropriation will have on 
land tenure, livelihoods, and the environment. Surveys 
also help governments to determine who is entitled to 
claim compensation. If the government fails to survey the 
land, unnoticed landholders may lose their tenure rights 
without compensation. 
Without adequate access to information on the 
expropriation plan, including the proposed justifications 
for expropriation, it is difficult for affected populations 
to understand how expropriations may impact their 
tenure rights, to participate meaningfully in consultation 
processes, and to voice their concerns about whether 
a proposed expropriation serves a genuine public 
purpose. For this reason, the FAO Handbook states that 
information provided to affected populations and the 
public should explain the purpose of the acquisition, 
identify the land to be acquired, and provide a clear 
description of expropriation procedures.69
Consulting the public and affected populations prior to 
expropriation can benefit governments by generating 
information that enables socially equitable expropriation 
decisions. The FAO Handbook recommends that “options 
should be analyzed and presented to the public for their 
understanding and consultation in order to choose 
the site that presents the fewest obstacles and best 
outcomes, having regard to all impacts, including those 
on any owners and occupants.”70 Using this information, 
governments can conduct proper due diligence and 
develop better expropriation plans by learning, ahead of 
time, the likely impacts on affected populations, the costs 
of compensation, and how the expropriation may impact 
the environment. Consultations can also reduce financial 
risks by diminishing the chance of delays that may arise 
when affected populations are not consulted and decide  
to protest or appeal expropriation decisions in court. 
Research Findings
Findings on the expropriation process are shown in 
Figure 3.
Figure 3  |  Expropriation Processes (Indicators 6-8)
  Yes
   Partial
  No
Prior to expropriation, must the government:
6. identify all affected populations?
7. inform affected populations about the acquisition 
plan, including the reasons for expropriation?
8. consult affected populations?
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Surveying affected populations: Only three of the 30 
countries assessed (India, Indonesia, and Vietnam) 
require the government to identify all affected 
populations prior to expropriation. Indonesia’s 
expropriation law, for example, requires that the 
expropriation process include an “inventory and 
identification of possession, ownership, use, and 
utilization of the land.”71 
Three of the 30 countries (Cambodia, China, and 
Philippines) require the government to identify some 
affected populations (e.g., owners), but not all affected 
populations (these countries received “partial” answers). 
In the remaining 24 countries, the law does not require 
governments to survey or identify affected populations 
prior to expropriation. 
Informing affected populations: All of the countries 
assessed require the government to give notice to 
affected populations prior to expropriating land. 
However, only 13 of the 30 countries72 assessed have laws 
that require governments to proactively provide affected 
populations with information on the expropriation plan, 
including the reasons for compulsory acquisition. China 
received a yellow “partial” because this information must 
be provided only when buildings on state-owned land 
are expropriated, but not necessarily when rural land is 
expropriated.73 On the other hand, 16 of the 30 countries 
assessed do not require governments to inform affected 
populations of the reasons for expropriation.
Consulting affected populations: Eight of the 30 
countries assessed74 legally require the government to 
consult affected populations prior to taking possession 
of their land. Five of the 30 countries assessed (Ethiopia, 
Philippines, South Sudan, Taiwan, and Zambia) received 
“partial” scores because their laws require consultation 
procedures only under certain circumstances.75 The 
remaining 17 countries do not require governments to 
conduct public consultations prior to expropriating land. 
Key finding: Of the 30 countries assessed, India, 
Indonesia, and Vietnam are the only countries with laws 
that require governments to survey, inform, and consult 
affected populations prior to expropriation.
6. COMPENSATION 
The VGGTs address three separate issues relating 
to compensation: entitlement (who is eligible for 
compensation); valuation (how should compensation be 
calculated); and whether compensation must be promptly 
paid and objectively assessed. These three issues are 
discussed in detail below.
Compensation Entitlement
Section 16.1 of the VGGTs states, “[States] should 
respect all legitimate tenure rights holders, especially 
vulnerable and marginalized groups, by . . . providing 
just compensation in accordance with national law.” 
(Emphasis added.)
The VGGTs do not explicitly define the term “legitimate 
tenure rights holders.” However, section 3.1 provides that 
states “should . . . respect legitimate tenure rights holders 
and their rights, whether formally recorded or not.” 
While the VGGTs call for states to look beyond formally 
recognized rights, states are presumably permitted to 
develop their own interpretations of what constitutes 
legitimate tenure. 
Definitions of “legitimate tenure” can be found in other 
international instruments. According to the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing (2013), for 
example, the concept of legitimate tenure rights extends 
beyond mainstream notions of private ownership and 
includes multiple tenure forms deriving from a variety 
of systems.76 The Special Rapporteur goes on to state 
that legitimate tenure rights can derive from statutory, 
customary, religious, or hybrid tenure systems.77  
According to Palmer et al. (2009), the term “legitimate” 
includes both legal legitimacy (rights recognized by law) 
and social legitimacy (rights that have broad acceptance 
among society). 
Customary Tenure Holders
While Section 16 is silent on whether customary tenure 
holders must receive compensation, the VGGTs place 
special emphasis on the protection of vulnerable and 
marginalized groups, a category of tenure holders that 
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presumably includes Indigenous Peoples and local 
communities who hold land under customary tenure. 
Moreover, Section 9.4 of the VGGTs calls for states 
to respect and protect the legitimate tenure rights 
of Indigenous Peoples and other communities with 
customary tenure systems. 
Recognition and protection of customary tenure is 
particularly important given that Indigenous Peoples 
and local communities are estimated to hold as much 
as 65 percent of the world’s land area under customary 
systems.78 However, research shows that only 18 percent 
of the world’s land is formally recognized as owned or 
controlled by local communities and Indigenous Peoples.79 
The World Bank estimates that more than 90 percent 
of rural land in Africa is undocumented and informally 
administered, making it susceptible to land grabbing and 
expropriation without fair compensation.80 Recognition 
of these territories is crucial given that up to 2.5 billion 
people inhabit and depend on community land.81
In countries where customary tenure holders must register 
or otherwise receive formally recognized tenure rights 
to receive compensation after expropriation, indigenous 
and local communities are at risk of expropriation 
without compensation.82 For example, expropriation 
of the Gambella farmland in Ethiopia, a country where 
land registration is required for compensation, displaced 
local peasant farmers without compensation because the 
farmers lacked certificates for their land.83 
Registration and titling procedures in many countries can 
be difficult to access, costly, and time-consuming.84 In 
India, for example, registration of customary forest rights, 
in accordance with the 2006 Forest Rights Act, has been 
riddled with delays.85 For these reasons, it is important for 
laws to ensure that customary tenure holders are granted 
compensation regardless of whether they have obtained 
formally recognized rights. 
Users of Undeveloped Land
Across the globe, there are millions of hectares of 
grasslands, woodlands, wetlands, deserts, pastures, and 
other commons, which governments often claim as state-
owned or as vacant or idle lands. However, these lands 
are often actually used by rural communities for grazing 
livestock, hunting animals, and other livelihood needs. 
Without statutorily recognized rights to compensation for 
loss of use rights to undeveloped land, these land users 
may be uncompensated when these common areas are 
expropriated.
Research Findings
The findings related to who is entitled to compensation  
are shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4  |  Who is Legally Entitled to Compensation? (Indicators 9-11)
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  No
9. Customary tenure holders with formally recognized 
tenure rights?
10. Customary tenure holders without formally 
recognized tenure rights?
11. Users of undeveloped land (land used for hunting, 
grazing, and other purposes)?
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Formal customary rights: Eighteen of the 30 countries 
assessed 86 have expropriation laws that require 
that customary tenure holders be compensated for 
expropriation on condition that they obtain statutorily 
recognized customary tenure rights (i.e. through 
registering or obtaining titles). Cambodia, India, Namibia, 
and Nigeria received yellow “partial” answers to indicator 
9 because their laws grant compensation to some (but 
not all) formal customary tenure holders. For instance, 
India’s Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency 
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement 
Act 2013 grants compensation only to customary holders 
of forest lands.87 Eight of the 30 countries do not grant 
compensation for customary rights, whether these rights 
are formally recognized or not.88
Informal customary rights: Registering or obtaining 
formal title to customary land is not a prerequisite 
to receiving compensation in six of the 30 countries 
assessed (Philippines, South Africa, South Sudan, 
Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia). In these six countries, 
recognition of customary tenure exists regardless of 
whether customary landholders register or obtain 
statutorily recognized titles to customary lands.89 
Burkina Faso, India, and Vietnam received “partial” 
answers for indicator 10 because their laws suggest 
that some customary tenure holders may be granted 
compensation without registering or obtaining title, but 
not necessarily all customary tenure holders.
Users of undeveloped land: Eleven of the 30 countries 
assessed90 have laws that provide compensation to users 
of some undeveloped land areas, but not necessarily all 
undeveloped land areas (these 11 countries received yellow 
"partial" answers). Zambia’s Land Acquisition Act, for 
example, received a “partial” answer to indicator 11 because 
it establishes a right to compensation for undeveloped 
land, but only if the land is used for agricultural or pastoral 
purposes.91 Claimants must also prove they have used the 
land within the two years prior to the expropriation.92 In the 
remaining 19 countries, the laws do not explicitly provide 
compensation for loss of access to undeveloped land that is 
used for pastoral and other uses. 
Key finding: Only six of the 30 countries assessed have 
laws that make strides toward respecting legitimate tenure 
rights by ensuring that customary tenure holders and 
users of undeveloped areas are entitled to compensation 
(based on an aggregation of the findings from indicators 
9, 10, and 11). In other words, Philippines, South Africa, 
South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia are the only 
countries that received a green “yes” for indicators 9 and 
10, and a yellow “partial yes” for indicator 11.
Calculating Compensation
Section 16.3 of the VGGTs states that, “States should 
ensure a fair valuation . . . Among other forms, the 
compensation may be, for example, in cash, rights to 
alternative areas, or a combination.” (Emphasis added.)
The VGGTs do not establish criteria for conducting a “fair 
valuation” of compensation. Defining these criteria is left 
to state actors, in accordance with national laws. There 
are varying interpretations of what constitutes a “fair 
valuation” of land (e.g. fair market value, replacement 
costs).93 The FAO Handbook provides guidance on 
determining compensation and recommends that 
compensation should be based on the principles of equity 
and equivalence. This means that affected persons should 
receive “no more or no less than the loss resulting from 
the compulsory acquisition of their land.”94 
Additional guidance on what constitutes a fair valuation 
for purpose of compensation is set out in sections 4.12  
and 4.19 of the FAO Handbook:
Compensation should be . . . for buildings and 
other improvements to the land acquired; for the 
reduction in value of any land retained as a result of 
the acquisition; and for any disturbances or other 
losses to the livelihoods of the owner and occupants 
caused by the acquisition and dispossession . . . The 
disturbance accompanying compulsory acquisition 
often means that people lose access to the sources of 
their livelihoods. This can be due to a farmer losing 
agricultural fields, a business owner losing a shop, or  
a community losing its traditional lands.95
Ensuring that compensation procedures capture the full 
range of livelihood losses is particularly important in 
countries with weak or non-existent land markets, where 
there may not be a clear market value.96
Gender-Sensitive Approach to Providing 
Compensation
Although Section 16 of the VGGTs does not explicitly 
require states to follow a gender-sensitive approach 
to calculating compensation, gender equality is listed 
WORKING PAPER  |  June 2016  |  19
Encroaching on Land and Livelihoods
in Section 3b of the VGGTs as a guiding principle of 
implementation. Section 3b establishes that states should 
promote gender equality, which is defined as “ensur[ing] 
the equal right of women and men to the enjoyment of all 
human rights, while acknowledging difference between 
women and men and taking specific measures aimed at 
accelerating de facto equality when necessary. States should 
ensure that women and girls have equal tenure rights.”
In addition to Section 3b, other sections of the VGGTs 
call for states to adopt gender-sensitive approaches to 
tenure governance, including Sections 4.4, 4.7, 5.3, 5.7, 
and 10.1. Additionally, Section 16.1 of the VGGTs calls for 
states to “respect all legitimate tenure rights holders . . . by 
providing just compensation,” and women landholders  
are a subset of “legitimate tenure rights holders.” 
Because of gender inequalities within land tenure 
systems,97 expropriations can have a disproportionate 
impact on women, especially when compensation is 
allotted in patriarchal systems. In societies where women 
are considered dependents of their husbands, and have 
no direct right to land, compensation is usually paid to 
the male head of the household. As the FAO Handbook 
discusses, if compensation is paid to the male head of 
household, the “needs of women and children may be 
ignored as the money vanishes, to the detriment of the 
family’s health and welfare.”98 When laws are silent on 
whether compensation must be sensitive to the differing 
ways in which women and men hold and use their lands 
and resources,99 compensation might be paid only to 
the male head of household. In such cases, women are 
put at risk of being disproportionately burdened by 
expropriations.
Compensation for Economic Activities and 
Improvements on the Land
The VGGTs do not explicitly call for states to account 
for the economic activities and improvements on land 
in the calculation of compensation. However, the need 
to account for these factors can be inferred from the 
term “fair valuation” in the VGGTs. For rural farmers, 
grazers, hunters, and other landholders whose land is 
their primary source of income, accounting for economic 
activities and land improvements is particularly crucial. 
When rural farmers live on and sell crops from their 
lands, expropriation may leave them without an income 
source. In Rwanda, for example, where household farming 
is a primary source of income for 74.8 percent of the 
population, a recent survey found that farmers affected 
by expropriations reported a 32–34 percent drop in 
income.100 The loss of other sources of income, such as 
rental income, is also important to incorporate into the 
assessment of compensation. 
Moreover, if compensation procedures fail to account for 
the land’s buildings, crops, and other improvements,* 
affected populations who built, used, and maintained 
these improvements might be worse off than they were 
before their land was taken. 
Compensation for the Historical/Cultural  
Land Values
Land has cultural, historical, religious, and sentimental 
value. This is especially true for Indigenous Peoples 
and local communities who have used their lands for 
traditional norms and practices for centuries. In addition 
to the VGGTs, the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples,101 International Labour 
Organization Convention 169,102 and IFC Performance 
Standard 7103 indicate that ancestral territories and other 
lands used for religious, cultural, and traditional practices 
must be protected and respected. 
As the FAO Handbook notes, it is difficult to calculate 
compensation for non-economic losses such as religious, 
historical, or cultural claims to the land.104 For instance, how 
can the government put a price tag on graveyards, historical 
places of worship, and other cultural heritage sites? 
Compensation in Alternative Land
Section 16.3 of the VGGTs provides that rights to 
alternative land should be offered as a compensation 
option. For farmers and rural landholders whose land 
is their primary source of income and livelihood needs, 
cash compensation payments may be insufficient to 
revitalize their livelihoods subsequent to expropriations. 
In Bangladesh, for example, where compensation is not 
payable in alternative land,105 77 percent of the affected 
households surveyed stated that compensation payments 
did not sufficiently cover the lost lands, and 90 percent 
stated they were unable to use the cash to purchase land 
equivalent in area to the land they lost.106 Using alternative 
* “Improvements” refers to the attached and unattached assets on the land (crops, buildings, etc.).
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land for farming, hunting, and gathering may be the only 
means by which these populations can earn a living, meet 
basic needs, and sustain their livelihoods. 
Research Findings
Findings related to the calculation of compensation are 
presented in Figure 5.
Gender-sensitive compensation: Of the 30 countries 
surveyed, India is the only country with a national law 
that considers gender issues in calculating compensation. 
India’s Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency 
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement 
Act of 2013 received a yellow “partial” score because it 
establishes a gender-sensitive provision, which addresses 
some of the gender issues associated with compensation 
procedures.107 Under Indian law, widows, divorcees, and 
women deserted by families are considered a separate 
category of “affected families” entitled to compensation, 
meaning that gender is at least partially accounted for in 
the assessment of compensation. However, the Indian 
government is not necessarily obliged to follow a gender-
sensitive approach to compensating affected landholders 
in every expropriation case (e.g. in cases where there are 
no “widows, divorcees, or women deserted by families”). 
The remaining 29 countries assessed establish gender-
neutral compensation procedures, meaning that laws 
in these countries generally grant compensation to “any 
person” with an interest or claim to the expropriated 
land. Women in these countries may be at risk of being 
disproportionately burdened by expropriations. 
Economic activities: Twenty-six of the 30 countries 
assessed either fully or partially ensure that compensation 
accounts for the economic activity associated with the 
expropriated land. Fifteen of the 30 countries assessed108 
grant compensation for all economic benefits generated 
from the land. On the other hand, 11 of the 30 countries109 
grant compensation for some, but not all, economic 
activities associated with the land (these countries 
received a yellow “partial”). Four of the countries 
assessed110 have laws that do not explicitly require that 
compensation take account of economic activities. 
Figure 5  |  How Must Compensation be Calculated? (Indicators 12-16)
  Yes
   Partial
  No
12. Must the government follow a gender-sensitive approach 
to calculating compensation? 
13. Must compensation reflect the economic activity 
associated with the land?
14. Must compensation reflect the improvements on the land?
15. Must compensation reflect the historical/cultural 
connections associated with the land? 
16. Is compensation payable in alternative land as an 
alternative or in addition to cash?
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Improvements: Twenty-five of the 30 countries either 
fully or partially ensure compensation accounts for 
improvements on the land. Sixteen of the 30 countries 
assessed111 have laws that require that compensation 
reflect all improvements on the land, while nine112 provide 
that compensation reflect only some improvements (these 
countries received a yellow “partial”). Malaysia’s law, for 
example, provides compensation only for improvements 
made within two years of the expropriation.113
Historical/cultural land values: Philippines is the only 
country with a law (the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 
1997) that helps to ensure that compensation payments 
reflect the historical/cultural connections associated 
with land. In addition to establishing special protections 
for ancestral lands held by Indigenous Peoples, the law 
establishes an Ancestral Domains Fund, which can be 
used to compensate Indigenous Peoples when their 
ancestral domains are expropriated.114 Six of the 30 
countries assessed115 establish legal requirements, which 
partially ensure that compensation will reflect historical/
cultural connections with the land.116 The remaining 23 
countries have laws that fail to ensure that the historical 
and cultural values of expropriated lands will be reflected 
in the assessment of compensation.
Alternative land: Seventeen of the 30 countries assessed117 
grant alternative land as a compensation option. This 
indicator assesses only whether alternative land is an option 
for compensation payment when land is expropriated, not 
whether alternative land must be provided as a form of 
compensation in every case. In the remaining 13 countries 
assessed, farmers and other rural landholders dependent 
on land for income are at risk of suffering significant 
livelihood losses because the law does not provide them 
with alternative land as a compensation option.
Key finding: None of the 30 countries have laws 
ensuring that governments will conduct a comprehensive* 
and gender-sensitive valuation of compensation, 
consistent with the VGGTs.
Prompt Payment and Objective Assessment of 
Compensation
Section 16.3 of the VGGTs provides that, “States should 
ensure . . . prompt compensation in accordance with 
national law.” (Emphasis added.) 
Section 16.6 of the VGGTs states that, “all parties should 
endeavor to prevent corruption, particularly through 
use of objectively assessed values, transparent and 
decentralized processes and services, and a right to 
appeal.” (Emphasis added.)
Prompt Payment of Compensation
Section 16.3 of the VGGTs calls for states to provide 
“prompt” payment of compensation to ensure that 
affected populations are able to maintain their livelihoods 
after their land is acquired. The FAO Handbook points out 
that, “when the acquiring agency takes possession before 
full compensation is paid, there may be little incentive 
for it to make the final payment.”118 The FAO Handbook 
further states that laws should prohibit governments 
and acquiring bodies from taking possession of acquired 
land until after a substantial percentage of compensation 
has been paid.119 When governments are not required to 
provide compensation payments in a timely manner, there 
is an increased risk that affected populations will fall into 
poverty while waiting for compensation to be paid. Box 7 
notes some examples of delayed compensation payments 
in the surveyed countries. 
 ▪ Despite the 120-day deadline on compensation, a recent 
survey in Rwanda found that payments of compensation for 
expropriation were, on average, delayed by 16 months past 
the legally imposed deadline for compensation payments.120 
 ▪ In Ghana, where there are no legally imposed time 
constraints on the payment of compensation,121  
compensation was not paid for approximately 90 percent of 
all land expropriated between 1966 and 2001.122  As of 2001, 
there were hundreds of pending cases in courts petitioning 
the government to either pay compensation or return lands to 
indigenous landholders.123 
 ▪ In China, where there are no legally imposed time constraints 
on the payment of compensation,124 the promise of cash 
compensation payments was unfulfilled in approximately  
one-third of the 476 land expropriations surveyed.125 
Box 7  |  Delays in Compensation Payments
* “Comprehensive” for purposes of this working paper means accounting for the economic activities, improvements, and historical/cultural connections associated with the land.
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The Right to Negotiate Compensation Amounts
Although the VGGTs do not explicitly call for states to 
provide affected landholders with the right to negotiate 
compensation levels, negotiation proceedings may help 
countries “prevent corruption . . . through the use of 
values that are objectively assessed using transparent and 
decentralized processes” consistent with Section 16.6. 
This may prevent outcomes such as those witnessed in 
Tanzania, where compensation allotments were reportedly 
calculated behind closed doors, were perceived as 
arbitrary, and caused mistrust of the government.126 After 
long delays, affected landholders in Tanzania were asked 
to either “take it or leave it” and were not given the chance 
to negotiate.127   
The FAO Handbook states that “fair and transparent 
negotiations [between governments and affected 
populations] help break down the barriers between the 
acquiring agency and the people whose land is being 
acquired, and can allow each party to have a better 
understanding of the needs of the others.”128 Additionally, 
good faith negotiating between parties can reduce the 
chance of delays later in the expropriation process; for 
instance, delays that arise when affected populations 
are unsatisfied with their compensation amounts and 
decide to appeal to courts. In Ethiopia, for example, 
where affected populations are not granted the legal 
right to negotiate compensation amounts,129 86 percent 
of the affected persons surveyed stated that they were 
not satisfied with the compensation offered when land in 
Bahir Dar was expropriated.130
The Right to Challenge Compensation 
Decisions in Courts and Tribunals*
Section 16.3 of the VGGTs calls for states to provide 
a right to appeal. Such appeals may be needed when 
governments use incorrect or illegal procedures for 
calculating compensation and, consequently, affected 
populations are allotted insufficient compensation.131 
Subjecting compensation decisions to judicial or tribunal 
review reduces the risk that compensation will be illegally 
or insufficiently assessed.
Research Findings
Findings related to the prompt payment and objective 
assessment of compensation are presented in Figure 6.
  
Figure 6  |  Prompt Payment and Objective Assessment of Compensation (Indicators 17-19)
  Yes
   Partial
  No
17. Must compensation be afforded prior to the taking of 
possession or within a specified timeframe? 
18. Can affected populations negotiate compensation levels?
19. Can affected populations challenge compensation 
decisions in court or before a tribunal?
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* A “tribunal” for purposes of this working paper means a government body, other than a court, that is granted legal authority to adjudicate and rule on compensation claims. “Tribunals” 
include land valuation committees, arbitrators, and other designated government bodies.
WORKING PAPER  |  June 2016  |  23
Encroaching on Land and Livelihoods
Compensation deadline: In 16 of the 30 countries 
assessed,132 governments are legally required to 
pay compensation prior to taking possession of the 
expropriated land or within a specified timeframe 
thereafter. Seven of the 30 countries assessed133 have 
laws that require governments to pay compensation 
promptly, but these laws provide exceptions that permit 
governments to delay compensation payments under 
certain circumstances (these countries received yellow 
“partial” answers).134 Seven of the 30 countries assessed 
do not establish time constraints on when compensation 
must be paid.135
Compensation negotiation: Twenty-one of the 30 
countries assessed136 grant affected populations the legal 
right to negotiate compensation amounts with acquiring 
bodies. Philippines and Namibia received “partial” answers 
because their laws permit some, but not all, affected 
landholders to negotiate compensation amounts. Seven 
of the 30 countries137 do not explicitly grant affected 
landholders the right to negotiate compensation payments. 
Compensation appeals: Affected populations are granted 
the right to challenge compensation decisions before courts 
or tribunals in 28 of the 30 countries assessed. In two 
of the 30 countries (Afghanistan and Vietnam), affected 
populations are not explicitly granted the right to challenge 
compensation decisions in court or before a tribunal. 
Key finding: Eight of the 30 countries have laws that 
provide prompt payment of compensation, a right to 
negotiate compensation amounts, and a right to challenge 
compensation decisions before courts and tribunals. 
Botswana, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and Uganda are the only countries 
assessed with laws that received green “yes” answers to all 
of the indicators in Figure 6 (indicators 17–19).
7. REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT 
Section 16.8 of the VGGTs states that, “States should, 
prior to eviction or shift in land use which could result 
in depriving individuals and communities from access to 
their productive resources, explore feasible alternatives 
in consultation with the affected parties . . . with a view 
to avoiding, or at least minimizing, the need to resort to 
evictions.” (Emphasis added.)
Section 16.9 states, “States should, to the extent that 
resources permit, take appropriate measures to provide 
adequate alternative housing, resettlement or access to 
productive land.” (Emphasis added.)
Several multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank, have resettlement 
policies that require borrowers to resettle and rehabilitate 
affected populations who are displaced by institutionally 
funded development projects (see Box 3 for discussion 
of World Bank Environmental and Social Safeguards).138 
However, these policies apply only to borrowers of 
institutional funding. When governments and acquiring 
bodies expropriate land without borrowing funds or 
receiving support from institutions with resettlement 
policies, the acquiring bodies are obliged only to follow 
domestic expropriation laws. For this reason, it is 
worthwhile to investigate whether domestic expropriation 
laws establish resettlement procedures and provide 
rehabilitation assistance. 
Resettlement Assistance
Expropriations can often lead to the physical displacement 
(physical relocation, loss of shelter) and the economic 
displacement (loss of income-generating assets or other 
means of sustaining livelihoods) of affected populations.139 
After affected populations are forced to move off their 
land, they may be subject to significant impoverishment 
risks, including landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, 
marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity, loss 
of access to common property resources, and community 
disruption.140 When governments are not legally required 
to provide a relocation allowance, alternative housing, 
or alternative land, there is an increased risk that the 
displaced persons will be disadvantaged by expropriations. 
In Ethiopia and Bangladesh, where resettlement 
assistance is not provided by law, displaced persons 
suffered a reduced standard of living after they were 
evicted. In Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for example, 1,320 
households were displaced from their lands to make 
way for an urban development project.141 Of the 66 
displaced persons surveyed, 29 percent earned less than 
500 Ethiopian Birr (ETB) (roughly $23) per month 
in their old villages. In the new resettlement sites, the 
number of households earning less than 500 ETB per 
month increased to 77 percent.142  Likewise, 103 of 133 
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households (77 percent) surveyed in Tangail district of 
Bangladesh said that their economic status became worse 
after resettlement.143
The VGGTs call for states to provide displaced persons 
with access to alternative housing and productive 
land. If the expropriated land was cultivable farmland 
which previously supported food crops or livestock, 
forced migration to degraded land will be particularly 
burdensome for the displaced populations.
Consultative Resettlement Processes
Allowing displaced persons to participate in the decision-
making process can help governments make more socially 
equitable resettlement decisions and reduce the risks of 
delays from disputes with displaced persons. For instance, 
in parts of India, displaced persons have persistently 
protested development projects that led to forced evictions 
without consultations.144
Avoiding or Minimizing Forced Evictions
Forced evictions can violate internationally recognized 
human rights, such as the right to property,145 and the 
rights to housing and an adequate standard of living.146 
As long as forced evictions are carried out in compliance 
with domestic and international human rights treaties, 
forced evictions are permitted under international human 
rights law.147 However, due to the profound impacts forced 
evictions have on human rights and livelihoods, the VGGTs 
call for states to avoid or minimize forced evictions. It is 
noteworthy that the World Bank Operational Manual on 
Involuntary Resettlement (O.P. 4.12)148 also requires that 
forced evictions occur only as a last resort.
Research Findings
Findings on issues of rehabilitation and resettlement 
procedures are shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7  |  Rehabilitation and Resettlement Procedures (Indicators 20-24)
  Yes
   Partial
  No
20. Are displaced persons legally entitled to a relocation 
allowance?
21. Are displaced persons granted alternative land and 
housing?
22. Must the alternative land granted to displaced persons be 
“productive” land?
23. Must the government consult displaced persons during 
the resettlement process?
24. Must the government avoid or minimize forced evictions?
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Relocation allowance: Eight of the 30 countries 
assessed149 have laws that grant displaced persons an 
allowance to cover the cost of relocating to alternative 
land subsequent to expropriation. South Sudan received 
a yellow “partial” because the 2009 Land Act states that, 
“government and private companies shall assist internally 
displaced persons and returnees in their efforts to improve 
their livelihood” but it is unclear whether this means that 
a relocation allowance is provided to displaced persons.150 
In the remaining 21 countries assessed, displaced persons 
are vulnerable to impoverishment from having to bear the 
costs associated with relocating to alternative land. 
Alternative land and housing: Three of the 30 countries 
assessed (Ethiopia, India, and Indonesia) have laws that 
explicitly grant alternative land to displaced persons. 
Three of the countries assessed (Ghana, Philippines, 
and Vietnam) have laws that grant alternative land to 
displaced persons in some cases, but alternative land 
is not guaranteed every time an expropriation project 
causes displacement (these countries received yellow 
“partial” answers).151 
Productive alternative land: Only three of the 30 
countries assessed (Ghana, India, and Philippines) have 
laws that provide productive alternative land to displaced 
persons, and only under certain circumstances (these 
countries received yellow “partial” answers).152
Consultations on resettlement: Only four of the 30 
countries assessed (China, India, South Sudan, and 
Vietnam) require the government to consult displaced 
persons during the resettlement process.153 Philippines 
received a yellow “partial” answer for indicator 23.154 
Minimizing or avoiding forced evictions: India’s 2013 
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land 
Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement Act is the 
only law assessed that explicitly obligates the government 
to avoid or minimize forced evictions.155 Philippines’ 
Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 and Taiwan's 
Indigenous Peoples Basic Law of 2005 received a yellow 
“partial” answer for indicator 24.156 In the remaining 27 
countries, there is no legal obligation on governments to 
minimize or avoid forced evictions, which means that, 
potentially, there is an increased risk of displacement in 
these countries. 
Key finding: Of the 30 countries assessed, India is the 
only country with a law that provides robust rehabilitation 
and resettlement procedures. In other words, India’s 
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land 
Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement Act of 2013 
is the only law assessed that received a green “yes” or a 
yellow “partial” answer on indicators 20 –24.
8. FINDINGS BY COUNTRY AND REGION 
Figure 8 aggregates the findings from the 24 
expropriation indicators and shows the total yes, 
partial, and no scores for each country. Figure 8 shows 
that, of the 30 countries assessed, India is closest 
to adopting the international standards established 
in Section 16 of the VGGTs. Indonesia and Vietnam 
are also noteworthy for having laws that incorporate 
several of the VGGT standards. Liberia lags behind 
many of the other countries because the passage of 
Liberia’s Land Rights Act is still pending. South Africa's 
Parliament recently passed an Expropriation Bill, 
which may change South Africa's results once it comes 
into effect. A comprehensive table showing how each 
country performed against each of the 24 expropriation 
indicators is provided in the Appendices.
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Figure 8  |  Findings by Country
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Figure 9 disaggregates the indicator findings by region. 
While it does not show a clear distinction between Asia 
and Africa, there are a few noteworthy points. 
First, Asia (defined by the 15 Asian countries reviewed) 
is slightly closer than Africa (defined by 15 African 
countries reviewed) to adopting the VGGT principles 
relating to limitations on the amount/types of land 
expropriated; expropriation processes; and calculation 
of compensation; procedural compensation rights; and 
rehabilitation/resettlement procedures. One reason 
for this finding is that Cambodia, India, Indonesia, and 
Vietnam recently passed laws that incorporate many of the 
standards established in Section 16 of the VGGTs. 
Second, Africa is closer than Asia to adopting the VGGT 
principles relating to eligibility for compensation. Of the 
30 countries assessed, there are more African countries 
than Asian countries with laws that grant compensation to 
customary tenure holders.
 
Figure 9  |  Findings by Region
   Asian Countries
  African Countries
Indicator on Public Purpose (Fig. 1)
Indicators on Limits on the Amount/Type of Land Expropriated 
(Fig. 2)
Indicators on Expropriation Processes (Fig. 3)
Indicators on Eligibility for Compensation (Fig. 4)
Indicators on Calculation of Compensation (Fig. 5)
Indicators on Procedural Rights Relating to Compensation (Fig. 6)
Indicators on Rehabilitation and Resettlement Procedures (Fig. 7)
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9. RECOMMENDATIONS
This working paper aims to establish a benchmark for 
progress to assist civil society organizations, NGOs, 
policymakers, advocates, affected populations, investors, 
and other stakeholders in measuring government progress 
toward adopting international standards on expropriation 
in domestic laws. 
In the majority of the 30 countries assessed, significant 
steps must be taken to ensure that expropriation laws adopt 
international standards established in Section 16 of the 
VGGTs. Progressive legislation on expropriation recently 
passed in Cambodia, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam 
shows that some governments are taking steps to adopt 
international standards and to ensure responsible land 
governance. But there remains ample room for progress. 
The six recommendations below are based on the 
research findings outlined above. They are directed 
toward governments, civil society organizations, and 
other stakeholders working on legal reforms relating to 
expropriation, compensation, and resettlement. 
1. Provide a clear conceptualization of public 
purpose to allow for judicial review. In 
accordance with Section 16.1 of the VGGTs, laws 
should provide a clearly defined list of public 
purposes to guide courts when determining whether 
proposed expropriation decisions serve genuine public 
purposes. Laws should subject government decisions 
to independent and impartial oversight by judiciaries 
to ensure proper checks and balances, and to prevent 
executive and legislative branches from abusing, 
misusing, or over-using expropriation power.  
2. Limit the amount and types of land that 
governments can expropriate. In accordance with 
the VGGTs, governments should limit the amount of 
land expropriated to the minimum amount necessary 
to achieve a public purpose. Governments should 
establish special protections for areas of cultural, 
historical, and environmental significance, and 
areas held by poor and vulnerable groups, including 
Indigenous Peoples and local communities. Laws 
should ensure that these areas are acquired only as 
a last resort, and, if expropriation of these areas is 
unavoidable, that the risks to these impacted areas are 
adequately addressed. One option for ensuring that 
states are sensitive to these areas is for laws to obligate 
governments to conduct and publish a cost-benefit 
analysis, whereby the government weighs the costs 
borne by the affected populations and environments 
against potential public benefits. In addition to 
thoroughly examining project plans (e.g., financial 
costs, schedules, and monitoring capacity) these 
assessments should incorporate public consultations. 
Government bodies should consider conducting a 
“proportionality test,”157 which entails examining 
a proposed expropriation project to determine (a) 
whether the expropriation project is necessary to 
serve a public purpose (there are no less intrusive 
alternatives), (b) whether the project is suitable 
(reasonably likely to achieve the intended public 
benefit), and (c) whether the benefits deriving from 
the expropriation are proportionate to costs borne by 
affected populations and the environment. 
3. Establish transparent and participatory 
processes for the expropriation of land. To 
conform to Section 16.2 of the VGGTs, governments 
should be legally obligated to survey, inform, 
and consult affected populations in an open and 
participatory manner prior to taking possession of 
expropriated land. By surveying affected populations, 
governments can determine who is entitled to 
compensation and understand the impact of the 
expropriation on livelihoods. Providing information 
on expropriation plans to affected populations can 
be an effective first step toward ensuring that these 
populations are able to participate meaningfully in 
expropriation decision-making and other processes 
(e.g., compensation processes, resettlement processes). 
4. Respect legitimate tenure rights by ensuring 
that customary tenure rights holders 
are compensated when their lands are 
expropriated. To ensure that tenure rights are 
respected, states should be required to compensate 
all affected populations, including unregistered 
customary tenure rights holders and users of pastures 
and other undeveloped areas. 
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5. Ensure that governments follow a 
comprehensive and gender-sensitive approach 
to compensating affected populations. 
Consistent with the VGGT gender provisions, states 
should be required to follow a gender-sensitive 
approach to providing compensation, accounting 
for the losses borne by women and men from 
expropriation. For compensation to comprehensively 
reflect all of the losses borne by the tenure rights 
holders, compensation payments should reflect the 
land’s historical and cultural value, in addition to 
economic activities and improvements associated 
with the land. Consultations with male and female 
landholders about the ways in which they use their 
land, and their land’s historical/cultural value, can 
be an effective measure to ensure that compensation 
is sufficiently comprehensive. Additionally, states 
should be legally obligated to pay compensation to 
affected populations prior to taking possession of the 
expropriated land, and should ensure that affected 
landholders can negotiate compensation amounts and 
appeal compensation decisions to courts or tribunals. 
6. Minimize forced evictions and, if evictions are 
unavoidable, provide displaced persons with 
a relocation allowance, alternative housing, 
or access to productive alternative land. As 
stated in Section 16.8 of the VGGTs, governments 
should be legally required to avoid or minimize forced 
evictions. When forced evictions are unavoidable, the 
government should be legally obligated to consult 
with displaced persons, and to provide them with a 
relocation allowance and alternative land to ensure 
that they are not subject to impoverishment risks. 
Lawmakers should look at India’s Right to Fair 
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, 
Rehabilitation, and Resettlement Act of 2013 as a 
model when drafting resettlement procedures that 
adopt the VGGT standards established in Sections 
16.8 and 16.9.




1. Is “public purpose” clearly defined to allow for judicial review?
2. Must the government expropriate only the minimum amount of land necessary to achieve a public purpose?
3. Are areas of cultural, religious, and environmental significance given special protection?
4. Is land held by poor and vulnerable groups given special protection?
5. Must the government grant reacquisition rights when the land is no longer needed for a public purpose?
6. Must the government identify all affected populations prior to the expropriation?
7. Prior to expropriation, must the government inform affected populations about the acquisition plan, including  
 the reasons for expropriation?
8. Prior to expropriation, must the government consult affected populations?
9. Are customary tenure holders with formally recognized tenure rights entitled to compensation?
10. Are customary tenure holders without formally recognized tenure rights entitled to compensation?
11. Are users of undeveloped land (land used for hunting, grazing, and other purposes) entitled to compensation?
12. Must the government follow a gender-sensitive approach to calculating compensation?
13. Must compensation reflect the economic activity associated with the land?
14. Must compensation reflect the improvements on the land?
15. Must compensation reflect the historical/cultural connections associated with the land?
16. Is compensation payable in alternative land as an alternative or in addition to cash?
17. Must compensation be afforded prior to the taking of possession or within a specified timeframe?
18. Can affected populations negotiate compensation levels?
19. Can affected populations challenge compensation in court or through a tribunal?
20. Are displaced persons legally entitled to a relocation allowance?
21. Are displaced persons granted alternative land and housing?
22. Must the alternative land granted to displaced persons be “productive” land?
23. Must the government consult displaced persons during the resettlement process?
24. Must the government avoid or minimize forced evictions?
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Figure A.1  |  Indicator Findings by Country
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Appendix B
Afghanistan 1. Government of Afghanistan. 2004. Constitution of Afghanistan. Available at:  
http://www.afghanembassy.com.pl/afg/images/pliki/TheConstitution.pdf
2. Government of Afghanistan. 2000. Law on Land Expropriation (Amended 2005).  
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/afg78399.doc
3. Government of Afghanistan. 2000. Land Management Law of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Available at:  
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/afg90120.doc
Bangladesh 1. Government of Bangladesh. 1972. Constitution of Bangladesh (Amended 2011). Available at:  
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bangladesh_2011.pdf
2. Government of Bangladesh. 1982. The Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance. Available at: 
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/bgd35873.doc
3. Government of Bangladesh. 1950. Acquisition of Waste Land Act. Available at:  
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/bgd95300.doc
Botswana 1. Government of Botswana. Constitution of Botswana. Available at:  
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/undp/domestic/docs/c_Botswana.pdf
2. Government of Botswana. 1955. Acquisition of Property Act Chapter 32:10. Available at: 
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/bot91353.pdf
3. Government of Botswana. 1968. Tribal Land Act Chapter 32:02 (Amended 1994). Available at:  
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/bot39051.pdf
4. Government of Botswana. 1970. Tribal Land Regulations. Available at: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/bot26411.pdf
5. Government of Botswana. 1962. Acquisition of Property (Board of Assessment) Rules. Available at:   
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/bot91354.pdf
6. Government of Botswana. 1987. Chieftainship Act Chapter 41:01. Available at:  
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/84990/94900/
Burkina Faso 1. Government of Burkina Faso. 1991. Constitution of Burkina Faso (Amended 2012). Available at:  
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Burkina_Faso_2012.pdf?lang=en
2. Government of Burkina Faso. Law 034-2012/AN Agrarian Reform Law. Available at:  
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/bkf139639.pdf
3. Government of Burkina Faso. 2009. Law 034-2009/AN on Rural Land Tenure. Available at:  
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/bkf95496.doc
Cambodia 1. Government of Cambodia. 1993. Constitution of Cambodia. Available at:  
http://cambodia.ohchr.org/klc_pages/KLC_files/section_001/section_01_01_ENG.pdf 
2. Government of Cambodia. 2012. Law on Expropriation. Available at:  
http://portal.mrcmekong.org/assets/documents/Cambodian-Law/-Law-on-Expropriation-(2010).pdf (Unofficial 
Translation).
3. Government of Cambodia. 2001. Land Law of 2001. Available at: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/cam27478.doc
4. Government of Cambodia. 2009. Sub Decree on Procedures of Registration of Land of Indigenous Communities 
of 2009. Available at: http://theredddesk.org/countries/laws/sub-decree-procedures-registration-land-indigenous-
communities-cambodia
Table B.1  |  Laws Reviewed for this Study
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China 1. Government of China. 2004. Constitution of China. Available at:  
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/China_2004.pdf?lang=en
2. Government of China. 1998. The Law of Land Administration of the People’s Republic of China. Available at:  
http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/34345.htm 
3. Government of China. 2007. Property Law of the People’s Republic of China. Available at:  
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471118.htm
4. Government of China. 2011. Regulation on the Expropriation of Buildings on State-owned Land and Compensation. 
Available at: http://landwise.resourceequity.org/record/270
Ethiopia 5. Government of Ethiopia. 1994. Constitution of Ethiopia. Available at:  
http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/Ethiopian_Constitution.html
6. Government of Ethiopia. 2005. Expropriation of Landholdings for Public Purposes and Payment of Compensation 
Proclamation. Available at: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/eth135247.pdf
7. Government of Ethiopia. 1960. Civil Code of Ethiopia. Available at:  
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/Civil%20Code%20(English).pdf
Ghana 1. Government of Ghana. 1992. Constitution of Ghana. Available at:  
http://www.judicial.gov.gh/constitution/chapter/chap_1.htm
2. Government of Ghana. 1962. State Lands Act. Available at: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/gha3105.pdf
3. Government of Ghana. 1962. Administration of Lands Act, 1962. Available at: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/gha3115.pdf
4. Government of Ghana. 1962. State Lands Regulations. Available at: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/gha3107.pdf
Hong Kong 1. Government of Hong Kong. 1998. Land Resumption Ordinance (CAP. 124). Available at:  
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_pdf.nsf/4f0db701c6c25d4a4825755c00352e35/28F18E70FD9CAA25482575EE0
03F5A41/$FILE/CAP_124_e_b5.pdf
2. Government of Hong Kong. 1990. Constitution of Hong Kong. 1990. Available at:  
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/hk00000_.html
India 1. Government of India. 2007. Constitution of India. Available at:  
https://india.gov.in/my-government/constitution-india/constitution-india-full-text 
2. Government of India. 2013. The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, 
and Resettlement Act. Available at: http://indiacode.nic.in/acts-in-pdf/302013.pdf 
3. Government of India. 2006. The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest 
Rights) Act. Available at: http://angul.nic.in/tribal-act.pdf/
4. Supreme Court of India. 2015. Savitri Dev v. State of Uttar Pradesh. Civil Appeal No. 4506 of 2015. Available at: 
http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/FileServer/2015-05-19_1432033960.pdf
Indonesia 1. Government of Indonesia. 1945. Constitution of Indonesia. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-
--ed_protect/---protrav/---ilo_aids/documents/legaldocument/wcms_174556.pdf
2. Government of Indonesia. Acquisition of Land for Development in the Public Interest (Law No. 2 of 2012). Available 
at: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/ins142768.pdf
3. Government of Indonesia. 1999. Act. 41 of 1999 on Forestry Affairs. Available at:  
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/ins36649.pdf
4. Government of Indonesia. 1960. Basic Agrarian Act. Available at: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/ins3920.pdf
5. Government of Indonesia. 2012. Constitutional Court Decision, PUTUSAN – Nomor 35/ PUU-X/2012. Available 
at: http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/putusan/putusan_sidang_35%20PUU%20 2012-Kehutanan-telah%20
ucap%2016%20Mei%202013.pdf
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Kazakhstan 1. Government of Kazakhstan. 1995. Constitution of Kazakhstan. Available at: http://www.parlam.kz/en/constitution
2. Government of Kazakhstan. 2003. Land Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Available at:  
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/kaz43145.doc
3. Government of Kazakhstan. 2011. Law on State-Owned Property (No. 413-IV ZRK). Available at:  
http://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=32885
4. Government of Kazakhstan. 1994. Civil Code. Available at: http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=200699
Kenya 1. Government of Kenya. 2010. Constitution of Kenya. Available at:  
https://www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/the%20constitution%20of%20kenya.pdf
2. Government of Kenya. 2012. Land Act. Available at: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/ken112131.pdf
3. Government of Kenya. 2010. Land Acquisition Act (Repealed by Land Act 2012). Available at:  
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/ken18461.pdf
4. Government of Kenya. 2012. National Land Commission Act (No. 5 of 2012). Available at: http://faolex.fao.org/
docs/pdf/ken112132.pdf
Liberia 5. Government of Liberia. 1984. Constitution of Liberia. Available at:  
https://www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/the%20constitution%20of%20kenya.pdf
6. Government of Liberia. Draft Land Rights Act 2013 (pending). Available at:  
http://www.sdiliberia.org/sites/default/files/publications/Land%20Rights%20Act_full%20draft.pdf
Malaysia 1. Government of Malaysia. 1974. Federal Constitution. Available at:  
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/my/my063en.pdf
2. Government of Malaysia. 1960. Land Acquisition Act (Amended 1992). Available at:  
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/mal33384.pdf
3. Government of Malaysia. 2008. National Land Code 1965 (Amended 2008). Available at:  
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/mal91850.doc
4. Government of Malaysia. 1956. Land Development Act, 1956. Available at: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/mal33393.pdf
Mongolia 1. Government of Mongolia. 1992. Constitution of Mongolia. Available at: http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/mg00000_.html
2. Government of Mongolia. 2002. Law on Allocation of Land to Mongolian Citizens for Ownership. Available at: 
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/mon42187.pdf
3. Government of Mongolia. 2002. Law on Land. Available at: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/mon62064.doc
Namibia 1. Government of Namibia. 1990. Constitution of the Republic of Namibia. Available at:  
http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/constitutions/namibia_constitution.pdf
2. Government of Namibia. Communal Land Reform Act 2002 (Amended 2013). Available at:  
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/nam137197.pdf
3. Government of Namibia. Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995 (Amended 2013). Available at: 
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/nam137198.pdf
Nigeria 1. Government of Nigeria. 1999. Constitution of Nigeria. Available at:  
http://www.worldstatesmen.org/nigeria_const1960.pdf
2. Government of Nigeria. 1978. Land Use Act. Available at: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/nig67625.doc
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Philippines 1. Government of Philippines. 1987. Constitution of Philippines. Available at:  
http://www.gov.ph/constitutions/1987-constitution/
2. Government of Philippines. 1997. The Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997. Available at:  
http://www.gov.ph/1997/10/29/republic-act-no-8371/
3. Government of Philippines. 2007. Supreme Court Decision G.R. No. 150640. Available at:  
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/march2007/150640.htm
4. Government of Philippines. 2000. An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National 
Government Infrastructure Projects and For Other Purpose (Republic Act, No. 8974). Available at:  
http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2000/ra_8974_2000.html
5. Government of Philippines. 1988. Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (Amended 2009). Available at: 
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/html/phi3886.htm
Rwanda 1. Government of Rwanda. 2003. Constitution of Rwanda. Available at: http://www.rwandahope.com/constitution.pdf
2. Government of Rwanda. 2007. Law No. 18/2007 Relating to Expropriation in the Public Interest (Amended 2015). 
Available at: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/rwa74723.pdf
3. Government of Rwanda. 2005. Organic Law No. 08/2005 Determining the Use and Management of Land in Rwanda. 
Available at: http://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/oeur/arch/rwa/ORGANIC_LAW_N.doc
South Africa 1. Government of South Africa. 1996. Constitution of South Africa. Available at:  
http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996
2. Government of South Africa. 1975. Expropriation Act. Available at: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/saf123400.pdf
3. Government of South Africa. Communal Land Rights Act (No. 11 of 2004). Available at:  
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/saf48109.pdf
4. Government of South Africa. 1996. Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996. Available at:  
http://www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/phocadownload/Acts/interim protection of informal land rights act 31 of 1996.pdf5. 
5. Government of South Africa. 2000. Promotion of Administrative Justice Act. Available at:  
http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/num_act/poaja2000396.pdf
6. Government of South Africa. 2013. Constitutional Court Decision. Agri South Africa v. Minister of Minerals and 
Energy (CCT 51/12). Available at: http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2013/9.html
7. Government of South Africa. 1996. Communal Property Associations Act. Available at:  
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/html/saf18746.htm
South Sudan 1. Government of South Sudan. 2011. Transitional Constitution. Available at:  
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/MONOGRAPH/90704/116697/F762589088/SSD90704%202011C.pdf
2. Government of South Sudan. 2009. Land Act. Available at: http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/
field_protection_clusters/South_Sudan/files/HLP%20AoR/South_Sudan_Land_Act_2009_EN.pdf 
Sri Lanka 1. Government of Sri Lanka. 1978. Constitution of Sri Lanka. Available at:  
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/lk/lk007en.pdf
2. Government of Sri Lanka. 1950. Land Acquisition Act CAP. 295 (Amended 1994). Available at:  
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/srl13617.pdf
3. Government of Sri Lanka.  2009. Land Acquisition Regulations. Available at:  
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/srl134058.pdf
4. Government of Sri Lanka. 2007. Water’s Edge Judgement S.C. (F/R) No. 352/2007. Available at:  
http://www.island.lk/2008/10/12/features16.html
Taiwan 1. Government of Taiwan. 1947. Constitution of Taiwan (Amended 2000). Available at:  
http://www.taiwandocuments.org/constitution01.htm
2. Government of Taiwan. 1930. The Land Act (Amended 2006). Available at:  
https://www.land.moi.gov.tw/onlinebill/505-n.doc
3. Government of Taiwan. 2005. Indigenous Peoples Basic Law. Available at: http://www.apc.gov.tw/portal/docDetail.
html?CID=74DD1F415708044A&DID=3E651750B4006467D4B40DD3AC1D7378
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Tanzania 1. Government of Tanzania. 1977. Constitution of Tanzania. Available at:  
http://www.judiciary.go.tz/downloads/constitution.pdf
2. Government of Tanzania. 1967. Land Acquisition Act (Act No. 47 of 1967). Available at:  
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/tan8958.pdf
3. Government of Tanzania. 1999. The Land Act. Available at: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/tan23795.pdf
4. Government of Tanzania. 1999. Village Land Act. Available at: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/tan53306.pdf
5. Government of Tanzania. 2001. The Land (Assessment of the Value of Land for Compensation) Regulations.  
Available at: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/tan28341.pdf 
6. Government of Tanzania. 2002. Village Land Regulations. Available at: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/tan28349.pdf
Thailand 1. Government of Thailand. 2007. Constitution of Thailand. Available at:  
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Thailand_2007.pdf
2. Government of Thailand. 1987. Immovable Property Expropriation Act, B.E. 2530.  
http://portal.mrcmekong.org/assets/documents/Thai-Law/Immovable-Property-Expropriation-Act-(1987).pdf
3. Government of Thailand. 2008. Act Promulgating the Land Code B.E. 2497. Available at:  
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/tha33176.pdf
United States 1. Government of the United States. 2005. Supreme Court Decision: Kelo v. City of New London. 545 U.S. 469.  
Available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/04-108.ZS.html
Uganda 1. Government of Uganda. 1995. Constitution of Uganda. Available at:  
http://www.statehouse.go.ug/sites/default/files/attachments/Constitution_1995.pdf
2. Government of Uganda. 1965. Land Acquisition Act 1965 (ch. 226). Available at:  
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/uga96348.doc
3. Government of Uganda. 1998. Land Act (No. 16 of 1998). Available at: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/uga19682.pdf
4. Government of Uganda. Supreme Court Decision Pyrali Abdul Rasul Esmail v. Adrian Sibo (Constitutional Petition 
No. 9 of 1997). Available at: http://old.ulii.org/ug/judgment/constitutional-court/1998/7
Vietnam 1. Government of Vietnam. 2014. Constitution of Vietnam. Available at:  
http://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/250222/the-constitution-of-the-socialist-republic-of-viet-nam.html
2. Government of Vietnam. 2013. Land Law No. 45/2013/QH13. Available at:  
http://www.itpc.gov.vn/investors/how_to_invest/law/Law_on_land/view
Zambia 1. Government of Zambia. 2016. Constitution of Zambia. Available at: http://www.parliament.gov.zm/node/4834
2. Government of Zambia. 1995. Land Act No. 29 of 1995. Available at: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/zam9900.pdf
3. Government of Zambia. 1970. Land Acquisition Act. Available at: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/zam36114.pdf
4. Government of Zambia. 1970. Land Acquisition (Prescribed Forms) Regulations (Ch. 189). Available at:  
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/zam45598.pdf
Zimbabwe 1. Government of Zimbabwe. 2013. Constitution of Zimbabwe. Available at:  
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe_2013.pdf
2. Government of Zimbabwe. 1992. Land Acquisition Act, Ch. 20:10. Available at:  
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/zim2771.pdf
3. Government of Zimbabwe. 1999. Land Acquisition (Disposal of Rural Land) Regulations (S.I. No. 287 of 1999). 
Available at: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/zim61669.doc
4. Government of Zimbabwe. 1983. Communal Land Act Ch. 20:04 (amended 2002). Available at:  
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/zim8836.pdf
5. Government of Zimbabwe. 1998. Administrative Court (Land Acquisition) Rules. Available at:  
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/zim61958.doc
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